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In 2019, the government of Ghana overhauled its access to public information rules through the 
Right to Information Act. Prior to this legislation, access to public sector information was not 
formally regulated and the new legislation provided a legal framework for making public sec-
tor information accessible to the general public. From an Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
perspective, the passage of the Right to Information Act represents a major policy change and 
provides a case in which the ACF theory of major policy change can be investigated. This case 
is also interesting because it took place in a unitary policy subsystem, as opposed to a competi-
tive or collaborative subsystem. Unitary subsystems are characterized by a single, dominant 
advocacy coalition, in this case a pro-transparency coalition, and are relatively uncommon in 
the ACF literature. The purpose of this paper is to investigate ACF policy change theory in the 
Ghanaian public sector information policy subsystem – as a unitary subsystem – to determine 
whether it can explain the major policy change that took place with the passage of the Right 
to Information Act. The investigation finds strong empirical support for the ACF’s ‘pathways’ 
hypothesis and moderate support for the ‘power’ hypothesis.
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Introduction/Background
In 2019, the government of Ghana overhauled its access to public information rules through 
the Right to Information Act. Prior to this legislation, access to public sector information was 
not formally regulated. Public institutions were under no obligation to honour information 
requests and generally exercised arbitrary discretion on the kinds of information suitable for 
public consumption (Kuunifaa, 2012). The adoption of the Right to Information Act provided a 
legal framework for making public sector information accessible to the general public. The law 
ensured that, with the exception of sensitive information exempt from public access, Ghana-
ians had the right to access information in the custody of public sector organizations. The law 
effectively guaranteed maximum disclosure of information and the government was enjoined 
to furnish the public proactively with information (Yawson, Armah, & Dadzie, 2010, p. 330).
From an Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) perspective, the passage of the Right to Informa-
tion Act represented a major policy change and provides a case in which the ACF theory of ma-
jor policy change can be investigated. The ACF defines a major policy change as one involving 
the introduction of new core attributes to a policy, shifting policy in a new direction in pursuit 
of new objectives. Prior to the 2019 reforms, Ghana’s access to information regime rested on 
the government’s discretionary powers and was mostly designed to allow the government to 
avoid public scrutiny. After the reforms, the presumptive policy objective is government trans-
parency, institutionalizing a process of access to information and reducing government’s con-
trol over the release of information, even information that might be embarrassing to it. Thus, 
a shift in the policy’s core attributes – from government opacity to government transparency 
– has taken place and the Right to Information Act constitutes a major policy change.
For ACF scholars, the Right to Information Act provides an intriguing case due to the nature of 
the policy subsystem that produced it. Anecdotal evidence suggests, and empirical investiga-
tion in this paper confirms, that the Ghanaian public sector information policy subsystem was 
unitary in structure, as opposed to competitive or collaborative. Unitary subsystems are char-
acterized by a single, dominant advocacy coalition, in this case a pro-transparency coalition, 
and are relatively uncommon in the ACF literature.
Currently, it is assumed that ACF policy change theory applies to all policy subsystems regard-
less of their structure and this case allows us to probe this assumption by investigating the 
theory in an atypical subsystem type. Unitary subsystems have a distinctive politics and it is 
reasonable to question whether current theory adequately captures and accounts for this poli-
tics. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to investigate ACF policy change theory in the 
Ghanaian public sector information policy subsystem – as a unitary subsystem – to determine 
whether it can explain the major policy change that took place with the passage of the Right to 
Information Act in 2019.1 The investigation finds strong empirical support for the ACF’s “path-
ways” hypothesis and moderate support for the “power” hypothesis.
This study is also the first application of ACF policy change theory to Ghanaian policymaking. 
Previous Ghanaian applications have used elements of the framework to inform their analyses, 
demonstrating its viability in the Ghanaian context, but have not formally investigated the 
ACF theory of policy change. Accordingly, this article opens an important line of research, pro-
viding insights into democratic policymaking in Ghana, as well as insights into the functional-
ity of ACF theory in a non-Western democratic context.
1 — In Ghana, some actors use the terms ‘public sector information policy’ and ‘Right to Information Act’ interchange-
ably. In our use of these terms, public sector information policy is the policy area being studied and the Right to Infor-
mation Act is a specific policy outcome – a major policy change – in this policy area.
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Theoretical Framework: The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)
First developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith in the late 1980s, the ACF has been 
one of the most widely applied policy process theories of the last two or three decades.
The unit of analysis in the ACF is the policy subsystem and within each policy subsystem are 
the various actors who claim a stake in a policy area and who regularly participate in policy pro-
cesses. The boundaries of any policy subsystem are defined by both a substantive focus and a 
geographical scope (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 193) which, in this case, is access to public sec-
tor information within Ghana. The ACF further assumes that actors in a policy subsystem are 
fundamentally driven by their beliefs and their desire to see their beliefs reflected in policy. The 
framework distinguishes between beliefs operating at three different levels of abstraction. At 
the deepest level are deep core beliefs, which are quite broad in scope, predominantly norma-
tive, and very slow to change in response to empirical contradiction. These beliefs are relevant 
across a broad range of policy subsystems and include such things as one’s left-right ideological 
orientation.  At the next deepest level are policy core beliefs which are intermediate in scope 
because they involve the application of deep core beliefs to a specific policy subsystem. Policy 
core beliefs are resistant to change, “…but are more likely to adjust in response to verification 
and refutation from new experience and information than deep core beliefs” (Weible, Sabatier, 
& McQueen, 2009, p. 123).  At the shallowest level are secondary beliefs which are narrowest 
in scope and which pertain to the details of various policy issues, such as preferred modes of 
policy implementation. Although secondary beliefs are linked to policy core beliefs, they are 
more empirically based and are therefore more amenable to change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, 
pp. 194-96).
Actor beliefs are important in the ACF because policy core beliefs, the mid-level beliefs de-
scribed above, serve as the rallying point for advocacy coalitions. Like-minded actors in policy 
subsystems often make common cause in pursuit of their policy goals simply because they are 
more effective working together than working in isolation. When a group of actors shares a 
set of policy core beliefs and engages in a non-trivial degree of collective action, they form an 
advocacy coalition (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 196). The ACF hypothesizes – and research has 
largely confirmed – that advocacy coalitions tend to be relatively stable over time, despite some 
turnovers in coalition membership, so that, on most major controversies in a policy subsys-
tem, there is a characteristic line-up of coalitions seeking to influence policy (Jenkins-Smith, 
Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014, p. 195). The number of advocacy coalitions in a policy 
subsystem typically ranges between one and five, with the exact number constituting an em-
pirical question (Sabatier, 1993). Advocacy coalitions are central in ACF theory because the 
dominant coalition in any policy subsystem shapes the policy decisions made.
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Figure 1: A Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Source: Weible et al. (2011, p. 352)
Since its inception, the ACF has spawned three lines of theory relevant to policy and policy-
making: a theory of advocacy coalitions; a theory of policy-oriented learning; and a theory of 
major policy change. Each line has developed distinctive hypotheses which have been repeat-
edly tested in empirical research. These empirical results have informed periodic revision of the 
hypotheses and even some revisions to the framework itself. While all three lines of theory are 
relevant, the most pertinent to this study is the theory of major policy change, which outlines 
the factors causing such change.
The ACF has a distinctive conception of public policy that differentiates between major and 
minor policy change. In the ACF, policies are assumed to be interpretations and reflections 
of policy-oriented beliefs. Just as policy-oriented beliefs have core and secondary aspects, so 
too do public policies. Core aspects of a policy have to do with its overall direction and goals, 
and a change in the core attributes of a policy is considered a major policy change. In contrast, 
the secondary aspects of a policy pertain to the implementation of core goals, and a change 
in the secondary attributes of a policy is considered a minor policy change (Jenkins-Smith, 
Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014, p. 201). 
The ACF theory of policy change is a theory of major policy change. Minor policy changes are 
assumed to result from dominant advocacy coalitions accepting new secondary beliefs – some-
times reluctantly – and translating these beliefs into policy, but there is no explicit ACF theory 
of minor policy change. The ACF theory of major policy change consists of two distinct but 
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inter-related hypotheses, each specifying a necessary condition, which together provide an ex-
planation of major policy change.
The first hypothesis holds that at least one policy change pathway must be present for a major 
policy change to occur. It states:
Significant perturbations external to the subsystem, a significant perturbation in-
ternal to the subsystem, policy-oriented learning, negotiated agreement, or some 
combination thereof are necessary, but not sufficient, sources of change in the policy 
core attributes of a governmental program (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & In-
gold, 2018, p. 147).
In other words, the hypothesis specifies four possible policy change pathways: a shock external 
to a policy subsystem, a shock internal to a policy subsystem, policy-oriented learning, and 
negotiated agreement between coalitions (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009, p. 124). These 
are each potential policy change pathways because they shake up a policy subsystem enough 
to create openings for major policy change. Multiple pathways may be at work in any given 
policy change, but the presence of at least one pathway is considered necessary for major policy 
change to occur.
The second ACF policy change hypothesis focuses more directly on advocacy coalitions and the 
balance of power between advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem:
The policy core attributes of a government program in a specific jurisdiction will not 
be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instated the 
program remains in power within that jurisdiction – except when the change is im-
posed by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & 
Ingold, 2018, p. 147).
This hypothesis claims that major policy change only occurs when the coalition that intro-
duced the status quo policy is no longer in power, except when policy change is imposed by 
a hierarchically superior jurisdiction. Given the close relationship between coalitions’ policy 
core beliefs and the core attributes of policy, this claim makes sense: when the coalition that 
installed the policy status quo is no longer in power, a new coalition with new core beliefs can 
shape policy and bring about major policy change. 
While ACF policy change theory is limited to explaining major policy change, there are no lim-
its to the scope of the theory in terms of policy subsystem structure; the theory is assumed to 
apply to all subsystems regardless of their structural characteristics. ACF scholars have identi-
fied two subsystem structural dimensions as particularly important: whether a subsystem is 
nascent or mature, and whether a subsystem is unitary, competitive, or collaborative. 
The first dimension differentiates policy subsystems based on how long they have existed and 
how much they have developed. Nascent subsystems are those that are relatively recently 
formed, while mature subsystems are those that are more long-standing and further devel-
oped. Mature subsystems are far more common in the ACF literature and, as we will see, the 
Ghanaian public sector information policy subsystem is an example of a mature subsystem.
The second dimension differentiates policy subsystems based on the number of advocacy coali-
tions present and the level of conflict between them. Unitary subsystems have only a single 
dominant advocacy coalition and there is typically little conflict in these subsystems as most 
actors share similar policy core beliefs. Collaborative subsystems have two or more coalitions 
and the coalitions share some beliefs, usually at the secondary level, resulting in an intermedi-
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ate level of conflict and some coordination or cooperation across the coalitions. Competitive 
subsystems also have two or more coalitions but share few beliefs and typically compete with 
each other for policy influence, sometimes quite intensely (Weible, 2008). The differences be-
tween unitary, collaborative, and competitive subsystems represent different types of coalition 
politics in policymaking, and it is therefore reasonable to question whether a single policy 
change theory adequately explains major policy change in all three contexts. This is the ques-
tion that we begin to address in this paper.
Although there has yet to be a comprehensive survey of the empirical frequency of each sub-
system type, it is probably fair to say that unitary subsystems are relatively uncommon given 
the limited number of these that have been identified in the ACF literature. Only two ACF 
studies have explicitly identified unitary policy subsystems: Ingold and Gschwend (2014) and 
Rinscheid (2015). Both of these studies examine policymaking in unitary subsystems, and 
Nohrstedt and Weible (2010) speculate on how unitary subsystems will respond to external 
shocks, but no study has yet investigated the ACF policy change hypotheses in a unitary sub-
system. This study will be the first to do so.
This study will also be the first to investigate ACF policy change theory in Ghanaian policy-
making. The ACF was developed – and subsequently revised – with US and Western European 
democracies in mind and it is worthwhile applying the framework and its theories to younger, 
non-Western democracies in order to assess their applicability in these contexts (Jenkins-
Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Ingold, 2018, pp. 156-159). Thus far, the framework has been 
applied to Ghana in at least two studies, both with promising results. Ainuson (2009) used 
ACF hypotheses about coalition formation and policy-oriented learning in order to understand 
Ghanaian water policy processes and concluded that the framework provided an effective way 
of understanding these processes. Similarly, Marfo and McKeown (2013) used the ACF as a 
heuristic framework to explain a negotiated policy change in Ghanaian forestry policy and also 
concluded that the framework was useful in the Ghanaian context. Thus, there is literature 
showing the utility of the ACF for understanding some aspects of Ghanaian policy processes, 
but there are no formal applications of ACF policy change theory, and this study will provide a 
first test of the theory in the Ghanaian context.
Methodology
This paper uses a case study approach to probe the limits of ACF policy change theory. The case 
selected was the passage of the Ghanaian Right to Information Act in 2019 and this was chosen 
because it was a major policy change in a unitary subsystem. This allows us to investigate ACF 
policy change theory in a distinct subclass of major policy change cases. Such an approach 
follows the advice of George and Bennett (2005, p. 77), who argue that using a case study to 
investigate a subclass (major policy change in unitary subsystems) of a general phenomenon 
(major policy change in all subsystems) is a useful way of contributing to theory-building by 
testing a general theory within a specific and somewhat atypical context.
In this approach, the Right to Information Act is considered a “most likely” case in which ACF 
policy change theory is expected to work since there are no existing theoretical scope condi-
tions that would preclude its application to this case (Gerring, 2007, pp. 120-121). If the the-
ory is supported in our investigation, the theory’s existing claim to general application across 
subsystem types is strengthened. If, however, the theory is not supported in our investigation, 
then we must consider whether unitary subsystems require differential treatment in ACF poli-
cy change theory. Either way, testing the ACF policy change hypotheses in the Right to Informa-
tion Act case makes a contribution to the ongoing development of the theory.
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We investigate the development of the Right to Information Act using the congruence method. 
Our approach is congruence, rather than process tracing, since we operationalize and inves-
tigate causal factors – the ones outlined in ACF policy change theory – but do not posit and 
investigate explicit mechanisms linking the causal factors and the outcome of major policy 
change (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, pp. 269-71). We do not investigate explicit causal mecha-
nisms as none are specified in current ACF policy change theory, making them beyond the 
scope of the current analysis.
Much of the data for this paper are derived from a content analysis of Ghanaian media arti-
cles using methods similar to Olofsson, et al. (2018) and Heikkila et al. (2019).The sample of 
articles was created using ghanaweb.com, a website that serves as a clearinghouse for Ghana-
ian news stories. Ghanaweb.com provided the most comprehensive archive of Ghanaian news 
stories that we could find, providing coverage from 2001 to 2019, which we took as our period 
of study. The ghanaweb.com news archives were searched for the following terms: “right to 
information bill” and “freedom of information bill” in order to identify relevant articles. These 
searches produced 826 news stories which were reviewed to remove duplicate stories, columns 
and opinion pieces, and stories that made no reference to a policy actor. The sample was further 
limited to include only articles from the Ghana News Agency, the Daily Graphic Online, and 
myjoyfmonline, three news outlets judged as credible due to their non-affiliations with politi-
cal parties or political movements and their relatively muted ideological orientations. A total of 
256 articles was included in the final sample. Media articles as a data source have the benefits 
of being accessible, low-cost, and replicable, but reliance on them also limits the data to what is 
reported in the media and we tried to overcome this limitation by supplementing our analysis 
of media articles with data from other sources. 
The purpose of the content analysis was to identify the actors who were active in the policy 
subsystem, to identify these actors’ policy core beliefs, and to identify patterns of agreement 
and disagreement between them. The media articles did not provide coverage of all the ac-
tors in the policy subsystem, but did provide coverage of the most high-profile actors, which 
was sufficient for identifying advocacy coalitions. The coding unit in the content analysis was 
the descriptions of policy actors. The article sample was segmented by reviewing each article 
and identifying all instances in which an actor was described as being involved in freedom of 
information debates or processes in any way. Each actor description was given a unique iden-
tification number and was subsequently coded, the coding decisions guided by a coding frame.
The coding frame was designed to capture several relevant actor attributes, including: individ-
ual names, organizational affiliations (if any), organizational types (political parties, domestic 
NGOs, international NGOs, etc.), policy core beliefs (whether they were pro or anti freedom of 
information), policy core belief rationales (their justifications of their pro/anti stand), agree-
ments with other actors, and disagreements with other actors. Appendix A lists these coding 
dimensions and the categories used in each dimension.
The coding frame was outlined in detail in a coding guide and, using this common coding guide, 
two coders coded the sample independently. The coding results with respect to policy core be-
liefs – the most important actor attribute from an ACF perspective – were then compared and 
all coding discrepancies were identified. These discrepant coding units were removed from the 
dataset so that there was 100 percent agreement between the coders, ensuring a high degree 
of inter-coder reliability on this crucial attribute. The final dataset had a total of 360 coding 
units with 84.7 percent agreement between the coders on organizational type and 83.1 percent 
agreement on core belief rationales. Any remaining coding discrepancies on these attributes 
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were treated as unreliable and excluded from the analysis. The data on agreements and disa-
greements between actors proved to be unreliable, with only 69.7 percent agreement between 
the coders, and these were excluded from the analysis.
The content analysis data, supplemented with other observations, were used to investigate the 
presence of advocacy coalitions in the policy subsystem, thereby determining the subsystem’s 
structure. The data on policy core beliefs were analyzed to determine which ideological group-
ings, at the policy core level, existed in the policy subsystem. Observations of collective action 
within each ideological grouping were then sought in the public record to determine whether 
there was a non-trivial level of collective action amongst actors holding the same policy core 
beliefs, which would indicate the presence of an advocacy coalition. Ultimately, the number of 
advocacy coalitions supported by the data indicated the policy subsystem structure which, in 
this case, was unitary.
We then investigated the first ACF policy change hypothesis by operationalizing the policy 
change pathways that may be present in this case: internal shocks, external shocks, and policy-
oriented learning. The negotiated agreement pathway – a fourth pathway specified in the hy-
pothesis – was not operationalized or investigated given the structure of the subsystem. The 
negotiated agreement pathway is logically impossible in a unitary subsystem since the subsys-
tem, by definition, has only a single dominant coalition and negotiated agreements between 
multiple coalitions are precluded. Any negotiation in such a subsystem will be intra-coalition 
and will likely be restricted to secondary policy attributes. 
Internal/external shocks were operationalized using data on media coverage from ghanaweb.
com. The assumption in this operationalization is that, when a policy subsystem experiences 
a shock, it should be evident through increased subsystem activity and increased media cover-
age of that subsystem. We collected data on the number of new stories matching the search 
terms “right to information” and “freedom of information” with the data aggregated by annual 
quarter for our entire period of study. We analyzed this data by looking for substantial spikes 
in media coverage, taking into consideration the fact that the extent of online news coverage 
increased over time during our period of study. Spikes in media coverage were then investi-
gated to determine the reasons for each spike, whether these reasons constituted shocks to the 
subsystem, and whether each shock was internal or external to the subsystem.
Policy-oriented learning was operationalized using data from the content analysis. The content 
analysis coded for actors’ policy core beliefs as well as their rationales for these core beliefs, and 
we examined these data to determine whether there was any shift in core beliefs or core belief 
rationales that might indicate the presence of policy-oriented learning. The data spanned 2001 
to 2019 and were divided into four time periods, each period corresponding with a different 
presidential administration and different efforts to pass freedom of information legislation. 
The beliefs in each of these four time periods were analyzed to look for any evidence of shifting 
beliefs between these periods, which might indicate the presence of policy-oriented learning.
The second ACF policy change hypothesis was investigated by operationalizing its two hypoth-
esized causal factors: policy imposition by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction, and the advo-
cacy coalition(s) “in power”. Since the only jurisdiction with the potential to impose policy on 
the Ghanaian parliament was the Supreme Court of Ghana, policy imposition was operational-
ized by investigating events surrounding the adoption of the 2019 Right to Information Act to 
determine whether it was motivated or compelled by a Supreme Court decision. To operation-
alize the second hypothesized factor, we drew on the ACF literature to determine when an ad-
80 In te r n a t ion a l  R e v ie w o f  P ubl i c  Pol i c y,  3 :1
vocacy coalition is “in power”. Sabatier and Weible (2007, pp. 201-204) have identified several 
political resources that advocacy coalitions can draw upon in seeking power, including public 
opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, skilful leadership, and formal 
legal authority to make policy decisions. Nohrstedt (2011) and Heinmiller (2013) (2016) have 
further argued that, out of these, the most important resource is the formal legal authority 
to make policy decisions because wielding influence over legislators is necessary to get policy 
reforms through the veto points of the legislative process. Thus, we considered an advocacy 
coalition to be “in power” if it was aligned with a political party possessing the formal legal 
authority in the Ghanaian political system to make policy decisions.
Data Analysis and Results: Structure of the Ghanaian Public Sector 
Information Policy Subsystem
The first step in our analysis was to investigate the structural characteristics of the Ghanaian 
public sector information policy subsystem. This analysis, based largely on the content analysis 
data, revealed that the subsystem was unitary and mature.
The policy core belief data from the content analysis overwhelmingly show that the Ghanaian 
public sector information policy subsystem was dominated by a pro-transparency advocacy 
coalition, supporting greater freedom of public information, throughout our period of study. 
Only one actor in the entire dataset had anti-transparency beliefs, with all others showing 
either pro-transparency beliefs or unclear beliefs. Appendix B shows the organizations, ex-
cluding individuals without organizational affiliations, which were politically active and which 
espoused pro-transparency beliefs during the four presidential administrations of our period 
of study. It shows how pro-transparency actors came from a wide variety of organizations 
and organizational types, with even the two major political parties, the left-leaning National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) and the right-leaning New Patriotic Party (NPP), both espousing 
pro-transparency beliefs. All of this shows the degree of core-belief consensus in the policy 
subsystem, characteristic of a unitary subsystem. 
There is also evidence that several actors with pro-transparency beliefs undertook collective 
action in an effort to secure freedom of information reforms. The best and most important 
example of this was the formation of the Right to Information Coalition-Ghana (RTI-Ghana) 
in 2003, the members of which are bolded in Appendix B. RTI-Ghana was an umbrella group 
comprising several organizations representing lawyers, journalists, and democracy and civil 
rights advocates, and which also had participation and support from several transnational or-
ganizations including the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and the West Africa Media 
Foundation. RTI-Ghana formed the core of the pro-transparency advocacy coalition and played 
a crucial role in educating the public, rallying supporters, and lobbying government until the 
2019 legislation was adopted (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Africa Office, 2019, p. 
14). The presence of RTI-Ghana shows clear evidence of collective action amongst many actors 
with pro-transparency beliefs, confirming the presence of a pro-transparency advocacy coali-
tion. Moreover, this pro-transparency coalition was unopposed by an anti-transparency coali-
tion, resulting in a unitary subsystem dominated by the former.
Evidence also suggests that the Ghanaian public sector information policy subsystem was a 
mature subsystem rather than a nascent one. To distinguish between nascent and mature sub-
systems, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, pp. 135-36) outlined four necessary and sufficient 
characteristics of mature subsystems (shown in italics below), all of which appear to be present 
in our case:
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1. Subsystem participants who constitute a semiautonomous community and who share a do-
main of expertise. As shown in Appendix B, the subsystem had many actors with expertise 
in this policy domain, and who participated in freedom of information politics span-
ning multiple presidential administrations. These actors also had regular interaction and 
seem to constitute a semiautonomous community (Commonwealth Human Rights Ini-
tiative Africa Office, 2019).
2. Subsystem participants who have endeavoured to influence policy for a long period of time, 
usually a decade or more. The origins of the subsystem stretch back to at least the mid-
1990s when new motivations for transparent and accountable governance emerged after 
Ghana’s 1992 transition to democracy in the Fourth Republic. A freedom of information 
controversy erupted in 1996 when the Bank of Ghana refused to give information on 
interest rates, inflation rates and national debt to the Institute of Economic Affairs, a 
domestic thinktank, citing national security reasons. This incident motivated several ac-
tors to take up the freedom of information cause and prompted the first draft bill on the 
issue in 1999 (Yeboah, 2019)
3. The presence of specialized agencies to deal with the subsystem topic at all relevant levels of 
government. The Government of Ghana has had a Ministry of Information, sometimes 
on its own and sometimes merged with another ministry, throughout the Fourth Repub-
lic and even before. The Ministry of Information also shows up as a regular participant 
in freedom of information policy debates in multiple presidential administrations, as 
shown in Appendix B.
4. The presence of interest groups that have mobilized to deal with the subsystem topic. Organ-
ized interests dedicated to government transparency in Ghana have existed for some 
time, the best examples being those who formed the RTI-Ghana coalition in 2003.
While the Ghanaian public sector information policy subsystem is both unitary and mature, 
it is the unitary characteristic that offers a potential challenge to ACF policy change theory. 
Mature subsystems are quite common in the ACF literature and there is little reason to ques-
tion whether ACF policy change theory has application in these subsystems. However, unitary 
subsystems are uncommon in the ACF literature and have a distinctive politics that may chal-
lenge ACF policy change theory. For this reason, it is worth investigating the ACF policy change 
hypotheses in this unitary case to see how they fare, as we endeavour to do in the next two 
sections.
Data Analysis and Results: Investigating the ‘Pathways’ Hypothesis
As described above, the first ACF policy change hypothesis, the pathways hypothesis, was in-
vestigated by collecting data on internal/external shocks and on policy-oriented learning.
The data on internal/external shocks show several potential shocks during our period of study. 
Figure 2 shows the number of new stories on “right to information” and “freedom of informa-
tion” in each annual quarter of our period of study, as compared with a five-year rolling aver-
age. The data have been adjusted to show only positive variance; that is, quarterly coverage 
that is above the mean. Any negative variance below the mean has been standardized to zero. 
Comparing quarterly coverage with a five-year rolling average was necessary in order to con-
textualize the data, as Internet news coverage increased steadily and substantially during our 
period of study for technological and social reasons that had nothing to do with the subsystem 
under study. The most relevant findings in Figure 2 are the substantial and short-lived spikes 
in media coverage that are evident at least five times during our period of study, as these are 
preliminary indications of internal or external shocks to the policy subsystem.
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The most pertinent of these spikes, for our purposes, occurred in the first and fourth quarters 
of 2018, just prior to the passage of the Right to Information Act in early 2019. We investigated 
events during and prior to this time to determine whether any might have qualified as being 
shocking to the policy subsystem. Given that most internal shocks are the results of policy 
failures, and that there was no status quo right to information policy at this time that could 
have failed, we discounted the possibility of an internal shock. Most external shocks in the ACF 
come from “External Subsystem Events” (see the ACF flow diagram in Figure 1) and four types 
of these events are identified: changes in socioeconomic conditions, changes in public opinion, 
changes in systemic governing coalition, and changes in other policy subsystems. Comparing 
actual events with these four event types, the evidence suggests at least three external shocks 
to the public sector information policy subsystem in the 2016-18 period.
The first external shock was a change in the systemic governing coalition when the NPP won 
the 2016 elections. The opposition NPP, under the leadership of Nana Akufo-Addo, secured 
53.72% at the first round, defeating the incumbent President John Dramani Mahama, of the 
NDC, who managed 44.53% of the total valid votes. In Parliament, the NPP won overwhelm-
ingly with 169 out of 275 seats, leaving the NDC with 106 seats (Electoral Commission of 
Ghana, 2016). This electoral verdict effectively guaranteed the incoming government exclu-
sive executive and legislative control, creating an enabling environment for the pursuit of new 
policy priorities. During its eight-year rule, the NDC missed several opportunities to pass right 
to information reforms, including a last-ditch attempt that failed when Parliament expired in 
early 2017. In its election manifesto, the NPP promised to pass such reforms when it came to 
power (New Patriotic Party, 2016, p. 40), and the RTI coalition had cultivated good working 
relationships with some members of the NPP, so the change in government seemed to open a 
new window for reform and to add urgency to the RTI coalition’s reform efforts.
The second external shock was a change in public opinion that developed from accumulated 
corruption scandals. Corruption has always been a major election issue in Ghana and the 2016 
elections were no exception. During the campaign, the opposition NPP waged a strong anti-
corruption campaign, highlighting the corruption scandals that stunned the nation during the 
Mills/Mahama eight-year rule (2009-2016). Key among the scandals – which are summarized 
in Appendix C – were the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency 
(GYEEDA) scandal, the Bus Branding scandal, and the embezzlement of funds at the Savanna 
Accelerated Development Authority (SADA). The rest were the GH¢ 51.2 million WOYOMEG-
ATE, the Mahama Ford Gift scandal and the financial malfeasance at the National Service Sec-
retariat (Stacey, 2016; GhanaWeb, 2016; Gyampo, Graham, & Yobo, 2017, p. 35). Many people, 
including the Executive Secretary of the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), believed 
that the NDC government lacked the political will to be transparent and to fight corruption, 
hence its inability to pass right to information reforms (GhanaWeb, 2018a). Upon assuming 
office after the 2016 elections, the new NPP government commissioned independent audits 
across various state institutions, leading to additional allegations of financial malpractice in-
volving officials of the past administration. Key among the new revelations were the Mobile 
Money Interoperability debacle (MyNewsGh, 2018), the Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD) 
scandal (GhanaWeb, 2018b), and the Social Insurance and National Insurance Trust (SNNIT) 
software scandal (GhanaWeb, 2018c). The situation was further aggravated when scandals in-
volving officials of the new government began to emerge in 2017. The Bulk Oil and Storage 
Transportation (BOST) saga (Ullo, 2018) and the Metro Mass Transit scandal (Kumsah, 2018) 
were significant among several allegations levelled against officials of the new regime. When 
prosecutions were not forthcoming, calls to fight corruption went wild and even key mem-
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bers of the ruling government threatened to campaign against Akufo-Addo. With the near-
consensus that significant measures were needed to fight corruption, the NPP government 
felt overwhelming pressure to act and the RTI bill became regarded as a crucial tool to improve 
transparency and reduce corruption. 
The third external shock was an impact from another policy subsystem when the Special Pros-
ecutor’s Bill was passed in 2017, and Martin Amidu was appointed to the Special Prosecutor’s 
position (Osei-Amoako, 2018; Osei, 2017). In addition to right to information reforms, the 
NPP promised to establish the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an institution independent of 
the executive, dedicated to investigating and prosecuting corruption cases involving political 
officeholders and politicians (New Patriotic Party, 2016). In December 2017, the Office of the 
Special Prosecutor was created by an Act of Parliament and Martin Amidu, a former Attorney 
General who served in the NDC regime from January 2011 to January 2012, was appointed 
as Ghana's first Special Prosecutor. Consequently, the first quarter of 2018 was dominated 
by discussions on corruption and on how to ensure that the new Special Prosecutor would be 
effective and there were loud calls from activists, opposition parties and civil society organiza-
tions to pass right to information reforms to support his work. 
Altogether, the evidence in support of the presence of external shocks is compelling. A change 
in government, a change in public opinion, and a spillover from a related subsystem converged 
in early 2018 to focus unprecedented attention on the right to information issue and to mo-
tivate government action on the issue. During the 61st independence anniversary celebration 
in March, President Akufo-Addo suggested that the missing link in the corruption fight was 
a Right to Information Bill. After the summer holiday, this set off a flurry of subsystem activ-
ity in the third quarter of the year, as evidenced by the second spike in media attention dur-
ing 2018, ultimately culminating in the passage of the Right to Information Act. Thus, there is 
not only strong evidence of external shocks, there is also strong evidence that these external 
shocks were contributors to the major policy change.
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Figure 2: Media Coverage of Freedom of Information Issues, 2001-19
Source: The Authors
With respect to policy-oriented learning, neither the core belief data nor the core belief ration-
ale data showed any evidence of policy-oriented learning. Given that pro-transparency core 
beliefs dominated throughout the entire period of analysis, there was no evidence of shifting 
policy core beliefs, as no actors flipped from anti-transparency to pro-transparency beliefs, 
or vice versa. The data on core belief rationales are summarized in Table 1 by providing the 
percentage of actors citing each rationale in each of the four time periods investigated. In all 
four periods, the overwhelmingly predominant rationale was one of fighting government cor-
ruption and improving government transparency, with all other rationales constituting mi-
nor parts of the discourse. This indicates that actors’ justifications for supporting freedom 
of information legislation did not evolve much over time, that there was no mass movement 
from one rationale to another, and that policy-oriented learning at this level was not evident. 
Given that there was no evidence of significant changes over time in either policy core beliefs 
or core-belief rationales, we conclude that the policy-oriented learning pathway was probably 
not present in this case.
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Table : Pro-Transparency Belief Rationales, 2001-19
Rationales Cited for Support-














14 (58.3%) 25 (58.1%) 38 (73.1%) 14 (43.8%)
Supporting economic growth/
development
0 (0%) 4 (9.3%) 2 (3.8%) 1 (3.1%)
Legislation does not go far 
enough (i.e., the legislation 
allows too little access to 
information)
1 (4.2%) 2 (4.7%) 1 (1.9%) 0 (0%)
Improving journalism 2 (8.3%) 3 (7.0%) 4 (7.7%) 3 (9.4%)
Total Actors 24 43 52 32
Source: The Authors
Altogether, our investigation found considerable evidence supporting the presence of the ex-
ternal shock pathway, but found no evidence supporting the presence of the internal shock 
pathway, or the policy-oriented learning pathway. The negotiated agreement pathway was not 
investigated since the presence of only a single advocacy coalition made negotiated agreement 
between multiple coalitions impossible. While only one pathway was present, the presence of 
the external shock pathway alone is sufficient to support the first ACF policy-change hypoth-
esis in this case. 
Data Analysis and Results: Investigating the ‘Power’ Hypothesis
The second ACF policy change hypothesis is a necessary condition with two sufficient parts: 
one of these is policy imposition by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction, and the other is that 
the advocacy coalition that instated the policy status quo is no longer “in power”. Each of these 
sufficient factors was operationalized independently to investigate this hypothesis.
The results with respect to policy imposition are straightforward. Only the Supreme Court of 
Ghana had the authority to impose the 2019 Right to Information Act on the Ghanaian Parlia-
ment, but an investigation of events leading to the introduction of the Act found no connec-
tion between a court decision and the reform. Thus, there is no evidence of policy imposition 
in this case and this part of the hypothesis is not supported.
The second part of the hypothesis was operationalized based on whether an advocacy coalition 
was aligned with a political party possessing the formal legal authority to make policy deci-
sions, and the results are more complex.
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In Ghana’s Fourth Republic, the formal legal authority to make policy decisions is shared be-
tween the parliament and the presidency, both of which are veto points in the legislative pro-
cess. Thus far, every election has resulted in the same political party controlling both the parlia-
ment and the presidency simultaneously, with periods of power alternating between the NDC 
and the NPP. The content analysis data show that, for our entire period of study, both the NDC 
and the NPP held pro-transparency core beliefs, aligning with, and sometimes participating 
in, the pro-transparency advocacy coalition that dominated the Ghanaian public information 
policy subsystem. This indicates that the pro-transparency coalition was in power, and that an 
anti-transparency coalition could not have been in power, in the lead-up to the 2019 reforms, 
which is consistent with the second ACF policy change hypothesis.
However, the hypothesis also implies that, sometime prior to our period of analysis, there was 
an anti-transparency coalition that was displaced from power by the pro-transparency coali-
tion revealed by our analysis. This anti-transparency coalition would have been responsible for 
instating the policy status quo that was replaced by the 2019 Right to Information Act. Given 
the non-democratic governments in Ghana’s recent past, such an anti-transparency coalition 
is plausible and even probable, but our data do not provide a direct observation of such a coali-
tion and its past presence and eventual displacement can only be inferred.
Overall, our investigation found no empirical support for the presence of policy imposition but 
some empirical support that the coalition that instated the policy status quo was no longer in 
power. It is clear that a pro-transparency coalition was in power during the passage of the 2019 
reforms, but it is less clear whether there was an anti-transparency coalition in the past that 
was displaced from power by the pro-transparency coalition, as the hypothesis implies. Thus, 
the available evidence is consistent with the ACF second policy change hypothesis, but addi-
tional research beyond our period of study would provide more certainty that the hypothesis 
is fully supported.
Discussion/Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper was to investigate the ACF policy change theory in a unitary 
policy subsystem dominated by a single advocacy coalition. There is reason to believe that uni-
tary subsystems have a different politics than their competitive and collaborative counterparts 
and that, therefore, the ACF policy change hypotheses might struggle to explain major policy 
change in unitary contexts. The unitary subsystem we examined was the Ghanaian public sec-
tor information subsystem and, specifically, the 2019 Right to Information Act reforms.
Our investigation found empirical support for both of the ACF policy change hypotheses, al-
though the evidence supporting the first hypothesis was stronger than that supporting the 
second hypothesis. With respect to the first hypothesis, there is clear evidence that a series 
of external shocks buffeted the policy subsystem in the 2016-18 period, providing a pathway 
for major policy change. Although none of the other pathways were present, evidence of the 
external shocks is strong and the presence of this pathway alone is sufficient to support the 
first hypothesis. There is also empirical evidence supporting the second hypothesis, but it is 
more equivocal. Evidence suggests that a pro-transparency coalition was “in power” during the 
development of the Right to Information Act, which is consistent with the hypothesis’s predic-
tion, but we have no direct evidence that the pro-transparency coalition overcame an anti-
transparency coalition, as is implied in the hypothesis. So the available evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis but is somewhat incomplete.
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Ultimately, we conclude that ACF policy change theory was largely successful in explaining 
this case of major policy change in a unitary policy subsystem. This provides some support for 
the theory’s implicit claim to be a general explanation for major policy change across policy 
subsystems of all types. However, this study was the first to investigate the ACF policy change 
hypotheses in a unitary subsystem, so its findings do not confirm the hypotheses and further 
investigations in other unitary subsystems – and collaborative and competitive subsystems, 
for that matter – are warranted. Only through repeated and accumulated investigations of this 
sort will we be able to confirm ACF theory as a general theory of major policy change across all 
policy subsystem types.
This study was also the first to investigate ACF policy change theory in Ghanaian policymak-
ing, with the results largely supporting the theory. This suggests that the ACF has at least some 
application in explaining how major policy changes take place in Ghanaian policymaking, even 
though the theory was developed with established Western democracies in mind and Ghana 
is a relatively young, non-Western democracy. Much further investigation, in other Ghana-
ian cases of major policy change, is needed before confirming the utility of ACF theory in this 
context, and this represents an important line of future research. Such research is also impor-
tant for understanding how Ghanaian policymaking takes place and how Ghanaian democracy 
functions in practice.
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Appendix A – Coding Frame for Content Analysis
 ● Coding Unit Identification Number
 ◦ Each coding unit has a unique identification number in the format: DD-MM-YY-NN-AA
 ● Date
 ◦ The date the article was published in the format: YYYY-MM-DD
 ● Source
 ◦ The newspaper, website, broadcaster, or source of the article
 ● Actor’s Name 
 ◦ Their individual name, if provided in an article
 ● Actor’s Organizational Affiliation 
 ◦ The organization an actor represents, if provided in an article
 ● Actor’s Organizational Type
 ◦ Coded as one of the following (select only one):
  Government
 ● A politician or staffer from the political party forming government at the national 
level
  Opposition
 ● A politician or staffer from a political party not forming government at the national 
level
  Public Servant
 ● An administrator working for a core government department or an arm’s-length 
agency at the national level
  Local government 
 ● A politician, staffer or administrator from a sub-national government
  Domestic NGO
 ● A non-profit advocacy or interest group that is based in Ghana and seeking social 
change in Ghana
  International NGO
 ● A non-profit advocacy or interest group that is based in Ghana and other countries 
and seeking social change in Ghana and other countries
  Industry/Business
 ● Private for-profit business or business representative
  International IGOs
 ● International organizations created by governments (e.g., World Bank, IMF, UN, 
etc.)
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  Journalist
 ● Print, broadcast, or online journalist or journalist representative
  Academic or consultant
 ● Researchers based in universities or private consulting firms
  Other
   Unclear
 ● Actor’s Core Beliefs on Access to Government Information
 ◦ Coded as one of the following (select only one):
  Pro
 ● The actor states in the article that they are in favour of a general right to government 
information; or, the article describes the actor as being in favour of a general right 
to government information
  Anti
 ●  The actor states in the article that they are opposed to a general right to government 
information; or, the article describes the actor as being opposed to a general right to 
government information
  Neutral or mixed
 ● The actor states in the article that they are neutral or ambivalent about a general 
right to government information; or, the article describes the actor as being neutral 
or ambivalent about a general right to government information
 ● The actor expresses both support and opposition to a general right to government 
information; or, the article describes the actor as both supporting and opposing a 
general right to government information
  Unclear
 ● The actor’s support or opposition to a general right to government information can-
not be determined in the article
 ● Actor’s Rationale for their Core Belief on Access to Government Information
 ◦ Coded as one or more of the following (select as many as apply):
  Corruption 
  Government spending/waste 
  Economic growth and development
  Democracy, transparency and accountability
  Public demand
  International image
  Legislation goes too far (i.e., the legislation allows too much access to information)
  Legislation does not go far enough (i.e., the legislation allows too little access to informa-
tion)
  Need for more study/information
  Electoral mandate (i.e., actor was elected to pursue/block reform)
  Improve journalism
  Other
  Unclear
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Appendix C: Prominent Corruption Scandals in Ghana (2009-18)
    • Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA) scandal: In 
2013, a journalist investigated the operations of GYEEDA and uncovered massive corruption. 
The government set up a five-member committee to probe the allegations and the findings 
largely corroborated the allegations. This led to the cancellation of all GYEEDA contracts with 
service providers. 
    • Bus Branding scandal: In 2015, investigations into the branding of 116 Metro Mass Transit 
Buses involving GH¢3.6million revealed that the company contracted, Smarttys, over-billed 
the government to the tune of about GH¢1.9million.
    • Savanna Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) scandal: In 2014, investigation re-
vealed that Ghana’s Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) had embezzled millions of 
dollars allocated to it. The inquiries showed that SADA paid GH¢32,498,000 to ACICL to plant 
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five million trees in the savannah zone but could only account for about 700,000 trees. It also 
found that SADA spent GH¢15 million on guinea fowl but could only account for a few of the 
birds. 
 ● WOYOMEGATE: The Government of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), under President 
John Evans Atta-Mills, fraudulently paid a financier of the party GH¢51.2 million between 2010 
and 2011. In July 2014 the Supreme Court ordered Woyome to pay the money back to the state, 
but the businessman did not do that.
 ● Mahama Ford Gift scandal: An investigation by Joy FM’s Manasseh Azure Awuni revealed in 
June 2016 that President John Mahama received a Ford Expedition vehicle, estimated to cost 
$100,000, from a Burkinabe contractor, Djibril Kanazoe. This sparked condemnation from a sec-
tion of the public. Opposition politicians and some society organisations accused the President 
of receiving a bribe, especially after it emerged that the businessman had won two government 
contracts worth over GH¢100 million after the President received the vehicle.
 ● Financial Malfeasance at the National Service Secretariat: In 2014, officials of the Bureau of Na-
tional Investigations (BNI) uncovered a GH¢7.9 million deep-rooted rot at the National Service 
Secretariat (NSS). Investigations showed that the amount represented the allowance paid to 
22,612 non-existent service people in more than 100 districts across the country.
 ● Mobile Money Interoperability debacle: The NPP government cancelled an existing contract for 
the development of a mobile money interoperability system in 2017 and entered into a new ar-
rangement to develop the same at a reduced cost. The new system cost the country less than $4 
million, relative to the earlier GH¢4.6 billion contract amount. 
 ● Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD) scandal: Joseph Boahen Aidoo, the Chief Executive Office 
of the COCOBOD, alleged that Dr Opuni (former CEO) had conspired with some top officials of 
COCOBOD to siphon cocoa cash. A whopping $400 million was reported to have been expended 
during the transition period – between December 20, 2016 and January 6, 2017. 
 ● Social Insurance and National Insurance Trust (SNNIT) software scandal: The Ghana Social Se-
curity and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) software corruption scandal involved the procure-
ment of ICT infrastructure at a cost of $72 million, a price tag that was well over the initial 
amount estimated for the project. The investigation was started in August 2017 by the Economic 
and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) after the allegations became known. 
 ● Bulk Oil and Storage Transportation (BOST) saga: Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation (BOST) 
was accused of fraudulently selling five million litres of contaminated fuel to two unlicensed 
companies, Movepiina and Zup Oil, which were allegedly set up few days before the sale, making 
Ghana lose about GH¢7 million in revenue.
 ● Metro Mass Transit scandal: The staff union of the transport company petitioned the Transport 
Minister to demand the removal of Mr Aboagye for full-scale investigations into his alleged cor-
ruption and procurement breaches. Mr Aboagye was accused of breaching several procurement 
laws in the acquisition of some 300 buses since taking over the company in 2017.
